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Abstract
Any empirical analysis of the credit channel faces a key identiﬁcation challenge:
changes in credit supply and demand are di!cult to disentangle. To address this issue,
we use the detailed answers from the US and the conﬁdential and unique Euro area
bank lending surveys. Embedding this information within a standard VAR model, we
ﬁnd that: (1) the credit channel is active through the balance-sheets of households,
ﬁrms and banks; (2) the credit channel ampliﬁes the impact of a monetary policy
shock on GDP and inﬂation; (3) for business loans, the impact through the (supply)
bank lending channel is higher than through the demand and balance-sheet channels.
For household loans the demand channel is the strongest; (4) during the crisis, credit
supply restrictions to ﬁrms in the Euro area and tighter standards for mortgage loans
in the US contributed signiﬁcantly to the reduction in GDP.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, E44, E5, G01, G21
Keywords: Non-ﬁnancial borrower balance-sheet channel, Bank lending channel, Credit
channel, Credit crunch, Lending standards, Monetary policy5
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Non-technical summary
The events unfolding in the global economy over the last few years suggests that the
ﬁnancial sector, and the banking sector in particular, is a key determinant of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Most European countries and the US have experienced the worst ﬁnancial
crisis since the Great Depression. The global recession that has followed also appears to
be the most severe of this era.
The role played by the banking sector in aecting the economy at large, in particular
through the supply of credit to the private sector, has become a central issue of concerns
for academics and policy makers alike. The provisions of credit to the private sector
to fund investment and consumption may be impaired in periods of ﬁnancial distress.
During these time credit restrictions may be the reﬂection of banks’ solvency and liquidity
problems, which constrain their ability and incentive t op r o v i d ec r e d i t .A tt h es a m et i m e ,
the worsened ﬁnancial position of ﬁrms and households may restrict their capacity to
borrow, because of their increased riskiness. Finally, the grim economic outlook may also
weaken the demand for loans.
During the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the actions undertaken by central banks in most de-
veloped countries were aimed at supporting aggregate demand, but also at countervailing
the reduction of credit to the private sector by banks. Therefore, identifying and quan-
tifying the mechanisms linking monetary policy, credit provision and the macroeconomy
becomes even more relevant.
In this paper, we address empirically a number of related questions on the impact of
credit channels on GDP growth and inﬂation and how changes in monetary policy are
transmitted through these channels. We also focus on the period of the recent ﬁnancial
crisis and look at the role played by bank balance sheet constraints in reducing GDP
through tighter credit provision.
We separate credit supply and demand by using a novel dataset based on the detailed
information from the US and from the unique and conﬁdential Euro area bank lending
survey, where we observe loan demand changes, changes in lending standards due to ﬁrm
(or household) changes in net worth/risk, and changes in lending standards due to changes
in bank balance sheet capacity (capital and liquidity).
Three sets of results emerge from the analysis. First, the credit channel of monetary
policy transmission is operational. Changes in overnight interest rates ae c tc r e d i ta v a i l -
ability, which in turn impacts output and inﬂation. These results hold for all type of loans
(business, mortgages and consumer) and economic regions, albeit with dierences in the
size and timing of the impacts. Moreover, both changes in bank balance sheet capacity
and changes in borrowers’ ﬁnancial position have an impact on GDP and prices through
credit availability.6
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Second, we quantify the dierent channels and ﬁnd that the credit channel signiﬁcantly
ampliﬁes the impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP and inﬂation. Moreover, for ﬁrms,
the impact through the (supply) bank lending channel is higher than through the demand
and ﬁrm balance-sheet channels. For household loans, instead, the demand channel is the
strongest.
Finally, focusing the analysis during the period of the ﬁnancial crisis, we ﬁnd that, in
the Euro area, a reduction of credit supply to ﬁrms signiﬁcantly contributed to the decline
in GDP growth — i.e. there has been a credit crunch with real eects. At the same time,
the actions of the European Central Bank and of the Eurosystem — both monetary policy
rate cuts and non-standard measures of liquidity provisions — gave a signiﬁcant support
to the real economy. In the US, restrictions to credit availability for mortgage loans were
more important in explaining the GDP decline.
These latest results may therefore give some indications on actions to be pursued by
central banks in response to ﬁnancial crises. Our analysis shows that when a ﬁnancial
crisis aects the provision of credit (for example because it aects in particular bank
balance sheet capacity), both policies of aiming at relaxing balance sheet constraints of
banks and of lower policy rates may be beneﬁcial and help to sustain economic growth
and employment.7
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“Extremely important outstanding questions for research. One is the [...] role of the
credit channel in our understanding of economic ﬂuctuations and monetary policy. The
literature in this area remains thin, and this thinness reﬂects di!culty in specifying the
relevant mechanisms and ﬁnding the supporting empirical evidence.” Boivin, Kiley and
Mishkin (2010), Handbook of Monetary Economics
“Much of the earlier macroeconomics literature with ﬁnancial frictions emphasized credit
market constraints on non-ﬁnancial borrowers and treated intermediaries largely as a veil
(see, e.g. BGG).” Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Handbook of Monetary Economics
“Fluctuations in the supply of credit arise from how much slack there is in ﬁnancial
intermediary balance sheet capacity [...]. Variations in the policy target determine short
term interest rates, and have a direct impact on the proﬁtability of intermediaries.” Adrian
and Shin (2010), Handbook of Monetary Economics
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The events unfolding in the global economy over the last few years suggests that the
ﬁnancial sector — the banking sector in particular — is a key determinant of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Most European countries and the US have experienced the worst ﬁnancial
crisis since the Great Depression. The global recession that has followed also appears to
be the most severe of this era.
Banks aect the economy at large through several channels. One of the most important
mechanisms concerns the provision of credit to the private sector. Bank balance-sheet ca-
pacity aects the provision of credit to the private sector that will use it to fund investment
and consumption. During the recent ﬁnancial crisis, for instance, credit restrictions may
have been the reﬂection of banks’ solvency and liquidity problems. At the same time, the
worsened ﬁnancial position of ﬁrms and households may have constrained their capacity
to borrow, because of their increased riskiness. In addition, the grim economic outlook
may have induced weaker demand for loans. Consequently, the actions undertaken by
central banks in most developed countries were aimed at supporting aggregate demand,
but also at countervailing the reduction of credit to the private sector by banks. Therefore,
identifying and quantifying the mechanisms linking monetary policy, credit provision and
the macroeconomy is particularly relevant.
In this paper, we address empirically a number of related questions: (i) Does monetary
policy aect GDP and inﬂation through the (broad) credit channel? (ii) What is the
relative importance of the loan demand channel, the (non-ﬁnancial borrower) balance-sheet
channel, and the (narrow) banking lending supply channel? Is the impact of monetary
policy dierent for loans to households and ﬁrms? (iii) Finally, focusing on the recent8
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ﬁnancial crisis, did constraints on bank capital and liquidity signiﬁcantly reduce GDP
through a reduction of credit supply?1
Any empirical study of the credit channel of monetary policy faces a key challenge
and the literature has not succeeded so far in deﬁning a clean identiﬁcation strategy to
address it. Changes in the demand for credit and in credit supply conditions are in
general unobserved variables. A restrictive monetary policy shock may reduce at the same
time credit demand and supply. When the policy interest rate increases, the cost of
the loan (lending rate) raises, possibly dampening loan demand. At the same time, also
the external ﬁnance premia faced by both non-ﬁnancial borrowers and banks increase,
therefore aecting credit. Observable credit macro-aggregates (quantities and prices) do
not convey enough information to isolate changes in credit supply. In fact, following
a monetary tightening, both the classical interest rate channel (through loan demand)
and the credit channel would predict a decline in the volume of new loans granted.2
Concerning the price of loans, average loan spreads may not even signiﬁcantly increase
in the aftermath of a monetary tightening because of ﬂight to quality of banks to the
best borrowers (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996). Hence, the composition of bank
loans’ portfolio changes as well, thus implying that average loan spreads and volumes are
insu!cient measures to identify the credit channel.
The literature has tried to solve this identiﬁcation problem with the help of micro data,
such as ﬁrm and bank level data (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). However, as pointed
out by Kashyap and Stein (2000), the micro identiﬁcation cannot analyze the total eect of
a monetary policy shock on aggregate credit and output, but only a dierence-in-dierence
eect by comparing banks (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 2000) or non-ﬁnancial borrowers
(see e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) with dierent degree of sensitivity to a monetary
policy shock. In addition, constrained borrowers may borrow from constrained banks
1For the deﬁnitions of the dierent channels see Bernanke and Gertler (1987 and 1995), Bernanke
(2007), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). As suggested by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Stein (1998),
Diamond and Rajan (2001), and Freixas and Rochet (2008), bank loan supply is shaped by the frictions
stemming from the agency costs of borrowing between banks and their non-ﬁnancial borrowers (ﬁrms and
households), but also between banks and their providers of funds (retail and wholesale depositors, and
equity-holders). Monetary policy inﬂuences the severity of these frictions via changes in net worth and
external ﬁnance premia of both non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial borrowers. Therefore it may aect loan supply
and, as a consequence, aggregate output and prices (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992; Diamond and
Rajan, 2006, 2009; Gertler and Karadi, 2010; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997,
2008; Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist, 1996, 1999; Matsuyama, 2007; Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2009; Adrian
and Shin, 2008, 2009; and, Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; and Stiglitz, 2001).
2Loan volume, in addition, is also aected by previously committed loans and credit lines (no new
lending). Furthermore, bank loan demand may increase after a monetary tightening to ﬁnance working
capital and inventory or because of a restricted access to market ﬁnancing for borrowers (see Bernanke
and Gertler, 1995; Friedman and Kuttner, 1993).9
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which make balance-sheet and bank lending channels correlated (Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994) and hence di!cult to disentangle. Moreover, analyses based on micro data generally
use actual credit granted (i.e. there is not an observed direct measure of loan demand),
and therefore, the micro-identiﬁcation has been forced to make restrictive assumptions on
loan demand changes. Kashyap and Stein (2000), for instance, assume that banks with
dierent liquidity levels face similar changes in loan demand as a response to a monetary
policy shock.3 As a consequence, the identiﬁcation using micro data cannot quantify the
relative impact on the real activity of the loan supply, demand and non-ﬁnancial balance-
sheet channels.4
In this paper, we identify shocks to loan supply and to loan demand by using the
detailed answers of the conﬁdential and unique Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for the Euro
area and the US Senior Loan O!cer (SLO) Survey. Euro area national central banks
and regional Feds request from banks quarterly information on the lending standards
that banks apply to customers and on the loan demand that they receive from ﬁrms and
households. The information refers to the actual lending standards that banks apply to
the pool of all borrowers (not only to accepted loans). Moreover, the surveys — especially
the BLS — contain information on the factors aecting banks’ lending standard decisions
— factors related to bank balance-sheet capacity and borrowers’ outlook, quality and risk
(for ﬁrms and households).5 This combined information is therefore crucial to identify
loan supply shocks, and also to disentangle the eect of the (supply) bank lending, the
(non-ﬁnancial borrower) balance-sheet, and the loan demand channel.
Since lending standards and loan demand may react to — but also inﬂuence — business
cycle ﬂuctuations (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), we embed this rich information on lending
3An exception is Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2010) who use loan applications and bank-ﬁrm
level data.
4On the bank lending channel, the available empirical evidence is not conclusive, and comprises both
analysis supporting the existence of the bank lending channel (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Peek and
Rosengren, 1995, 1997, 2009) and evidence in favour of a more conventional transmission mechanism
(Romer and Romer 1990; Ramey 1993). A key issue is not only to identify but also to quantify the
dierent sub-channels (Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin, 2010).
5The information gathered from the BLS is better than from the SLO under dierent aspects. The
responses related to the factors ae c t i n gb a n k s ’d e c i s i o n st oc h a n g el e n d i n gs t a n d a r d si sm u c hm o r ec o m -
prehensive in the Euro area BLS than in the US SLO - a key information to identify the supply channel. In
addition, loan demand and lending standards are signiﬁcantly less correlated in the Euro area than in US.
Moreover, lending standards on mortgage loans have signiﬁcantly more variability in the Euro area than
in the U.S., probably because in Europe banks are by far the main providers of mortgages, as opposed to
the US. Also, in the Euro area there is a common monetary policy but some cross-country heterogeneity
of the business and credit cycles. Finally, the Euro area is a bank dominated system as compared to U.S.,
which is more market dominated (see Allen et al., 2004). All this makes the bank lending survey from the
Euro area unique.10
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standards and loan demand into an otherwise standard VAR methodology to account for
the linkages between the credit and the business cycle (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 1999). For the Euro area we use a panel VAR including lending standards and loan
demand from the BLS for each of the 12 countries which comprised the Euro area in 2002,
the year when the BLS was launched. This framework takes into account the common
monetary policy and some degree of cross-country heterogeneity in the business and credit
cycles. For the US we estimate a one-country VAR. Data availability dictate the time span
estimation in both economies: 2002:Q4—2009:Q4 for the Euro area and 1992:Q3—2009:Q4
for the US.
For the identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks, we follow Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (1999) and Angeloni et al. (2003) and use the overnight rate as the monetary
policy instrument. In response to the ﬁnancial crisis, in October 2008 the ECB signiﬁcantly
relaxed its policy stance by reducing the policy rate and by introducing a measure of credit
enhancement. In this framework the Eurosystem has been lending to banks through
ﬁxed-rate full-allotment liquidity auctions. The implementation of this policy brought
the overnight rate (EONIA) signiﬁcantly below the policy rate (Trichet, 2009, and ECB,
2009). Based on this observation, we believe that the EONIA rate is a sensible measure
of monetary policy even during the crisis time. For the sake of symmetry we consider the
Federal Funds Rate as the measure of monetary policy for the US, though the actions by the
Federal Reserve during the crisis were directed towards several markets and implemented
through dierent mechanisms (Bernanke, 2009, and ECB, 2009). Hence, for the US the
overnight rates may not be a comprehensive measure of monetary policy stance during the
crisis. Nonetheless, the main results of the paper (both for the Euro area and for the US)
are robust to a shorter sample, ending in 2008:Q3 (the time of Lehman Brothers’ failure).
For the identiﬁcation of the credit shocks, we trust the bankers and interpret their
assessment as truthfully reﬂecting conditions in the bank credit markets. Consequently,
we interpret an innovation to the answers related to demand for loans as a shock to credit
demand, and an innovation to changes in total lending standards as a shock to credit
availability (broad credit channel). Changes in total lending standards can be further de-
composed in two variables using the answers related to the factors aecting these changes.
We interpret an innovation to changes of credit standards due to banks’ changes in balance-
sheet strength and competition as a measure of credit supply (bank lending channel), and
an innovation to change of credit standards due to ﬁrms’ (households’) changes in balance-
sheet strength as a measure of borrower’s quality (ﬁrm/household balance-sheet channel).
A visual inspection of the credit availability shocks estimated from the model suggest that
they are consistent with episodes of restrictions in the credit markets both in the Euro
area and in the US. Shocks to credit supply in the Euro area are also in line with periods11
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of interbank market impairment during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Our paper makes a key contribution to the literature on monetary policy transmission.
We disentangle loan supply from demand in a novel and direct way by using unique,
conﬁdential information from banks on the lending standards applied to and on the loan
demand received from ﬁrms and households, and, importantly, on the reasons behind
banks’ decisions to change their lending standards (borrower or bank change in net worth).6
This strategy allows to identify the impact of a monetary policy shock on aggregate output
and prices through loan demand, supply and the non-ﬁnancial borrower balance-sheet
channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1987, 1989, 1995; Diamond and Rajan, 2006; Gertler
and Kiyotaki, 2009, Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin, 2010; Adrian and Shin, 2010). Following
up on Den Haan et al. (2007), we also show the dierential eects of monetary policy
shocks on dierent lending markets (business, mortgage and consumer loans) and assess the
importance of bank loan portfolio composition eects for the monetary policy transmission.
Finally, we also contribute to the emerging literature on the current crisis. By building up
on the methodology used to analyze the transmission channels, we study how the dierent
shocks have impacted aggregate output during the crisis by analyzing potential credit
crunches, their real implications, and the eect of monetary policy (Diamond and Rajan,
2009; Gertler and Karadi, 2009). Our results may help to shed light on theories linking
the business cycle and the ﬁnancial sector. At the same time, they also have important
policy implications for central banks and governments.
Three sets of results emerge from the analysis. First, the (broad) credit channel is
operational. A monetary policy shock aects credit availability, and a credit availability
shock aects GDP growth and inﬂation. Results are signiﬁcant for business, mortgage,
and consumer loans, but there are dierences in the size and timing of the impact across
borrowers and economic regions. Once we disentangle the eect of changes in lending
standards due to bank balance-sheet capacity and competition pressures from changes
due to borrower quality, we ﬁnd that both the bank lending channel and the ﬁrm and
household balance-sheet channels are operational.
6Lown and Morgan (2006) analyze the information content of the US SLO. However, they use only the
answers from one of the questions of the survey on lending standards — namely changes in credit standards
applied to C&I loans — and proxy loan demand with the macro variables commonly used by the previous
literature. In fact, since they aim at analyzing the predictive power of lending standards, their priority is
to use the whole history of the SLO survey and, therefore, cannot include the answers to questions related
to the loan demand, which only started in 1991. They ﬁnd that the credit standards predict future output
and credit growth. Our work is dierent in aim and scope, as we test the credit channel of monetary policy
and use several answers from the bank lending survey to fully exploit its information content. The surveys
— the BLS in particular — include questions on the factors behind the decision to change lending standards.
We exploit this information together with the answers related to the loan demand to identify the credit
channels of monetary policy.12
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Second, we quantify the relative importance of the channels for dierent types of
borrowers by analyzing the economic signiﬁcance of the dierent impacts through appro-
priately designed counterfactuals. We ﬁnd that the (broad) credit channel ampliﬁes the
impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP and inﬂation. For business loans, this impact
is higher through the supply bank lending channel than through the demand and balance-
sheet channels. For household loans, the demand channel is the strongest. Nonetheless,
the impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP through the ﬁrm and the household balance
sheet channels are still economically signiﬁcant.
Finally, we implement a shock decomposition of GDP growth during the period of the
ﬁnancial crisis in the Euro area and in the US. In the Euro area the shock decomposition of
GDP growth suggests that a reduction of credit supply to ﬁrms due to bank balance sheet
constraints signiﬁcantly contributed to the decline of GDP growth — i.e., there has been
a credit crunch for ﬁrms in turn leading to a signiﬁcant reduction in GDP (see Bernanke
and Lown, 1991). The current expansionary monetary policy, at least in the Euro area,
seems to have supported GDP growth, both aiming at relaxing balance sheet constraints of
banks and at lowering short-term interest rates (see Gertler and Karadi, 2009). In the US,
restrictions in credit availability for mortgage loans are among the most important shocks
to explain changes in GDP growth during the crisis period. In the US case, unfortunately,
one cannot distinguish the impact of restrictions due to lower net worth of US households
vis-a-vis problems in bank capital and liquidity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the
analysis focusing on the details of the Euro area BLS and the US SLO Survey, and reviews
the empirical identiﬁcation and the methodology. Section 3 presents and discusses the
results. Section 4 summarizes the paper, discusses the policy implications, and concludes.
2 Data, identiﬁcation and methodology
As explained above, the key testable hypotheses from the theory of the credit channel of
monetary policy transmission are the following:
1. A contractive monetary policy shock reduces bank loan supply, reducing in turn
aggregate output and prices.
2. The monetary policy shock is transmitted through changes to the net worth of the
non-ﬁnancial borrower (ﬁrm and household) and of the bank - the balance sheet and
the bank lending channel.
The main identiﬁcation challenges, as explained above, are:13
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1. Disentangle the impact of shocks to loan demand and to loan supply.
2. Disentangle the eect of the (non-ﬁnancial borrower) ﬁrm and household balance-
sheet channel from the bank lending channel.
In this section we explain how we deal with the two main testable predictions from
the theory, focusing in particular on the data which helps us to address the identiﬁcation
challenges.
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the use of the answers reported in the Euro area
BLS and in the US SLO. National central banks of the euro area and regional Feds re-
quest from banks quarterly information on the lending standards banks apply (including
the reasons for changing them), and on the loan demand they receive from ﬁrms and
households. The fact that the survey is carried out by the central banks — often also
supervisory authorities — contributes to the reliability of the information received and to
the overall credibility of the survey. The economic interpretation of the answers reported
in the surveys in terms of supply of and demand for credit follows naturally from the
questions formulated. Therefore, we trust the bankers in their assessment of the lending
standards applied to ﬁrms and households, the reasons (banks argue) for changing these
standards (due to changes in borrowers’ balance sheets and in banks’ balance-sheet po-
sitions), and the loan demand that banks received.7 Our empirical strategy consists in
embedding, within an otherwise standard VAR model, the rich information from the bank
lending surveys — the panel of conﬁdential answers aggregated by country for 12 Euro area
countries and the publicly available aggregate answers for the US.
The following sub-sections describe in detail the data used in the analysis and the
empirical methodology. In particular, Section 2.1 summarizes the setup of the Euro area
BLS. Section 2.2 describes brieﬂy the main characteristics of the US survey that has already
been used in the literature (Lown and Morgan, 2006). Section 2.3 describes the aggregate
variables we use from the BLS and SLO. Section 2.4 describes the other macroeconomic
series used for the analysis. Finally, in Section 2.5 we illustrate our empirical methodology.
The identiﬁcation strategy is common for all the countries of the Euro area. However, some
dierences are present between Euro area and US due to the availability of data (see also
the Appendix).
7Lown and Morgan (2006) and De Bondt et al. (2010) show that the surveys have predictive power for
output and credit growth in the US and in the Euro area respectively. A recent paper based on Italian
data at the level of individual banks investigates also the link between the BLS answers and credit data
and ﬁnd indeed that the answers from the surveys are reliable indicators of developments in the marlets
for bank loans (see Del Giovane, Ginette and Nobili, 2009).14
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2.1 The Euro area BLS
The national central banks of the Eurosystem request a representative sample of banks in
each country to provide quarterly information on the lending standards that banks apply
to customers and on the loan demand that banks receive.8 The survey contains 18 speciﬁc
questions on past and expected (bank) credit market developments. Past developments
refer to lending standards applied and to loan demand received over the past three months,
while expected developments focus on what it is expected in the following quarter. Two
borrower sectors are the focus of the survey: ﬁrms and households. Loans to households
are further disentangled in loans for house purchase and for consumer credit, consistently
with the classiﬁcation of loans in the o!cial statistics of the Euro area.9
The questions imply only qualitative answers and no ﬁgures are required. The answers
are collected by the national central banks of the Euro area countries. Typically the
questionnaire is sent to senior loan o!cers, such as the chairperson of the bank’s credit
committee. The sample of banks is representative of the banking sector in each country.
Therefore it comprises banks of dierent size, although some preference was given to the
inclusion of large banks.10 The analysis reported in this paper is based on the aggregate
answers received from a sample of around 90 banks.11 The response rate has been 100%
almost all the time.
The scope and the coverage of the Survey have changed little since its inception.
Concerning the questionnaire, the regular questions have been kept ﬁxed throughout the
sample. A number of ad-hoc questions were added at times to shed light on speciﬁc issues.
We do not use the answers to these questions since they are available only for few quarters.
The questionnaire covers both supply of and demand for bank loans. Concerning sup-
p l yo fl o a n s ,w h i c ha r ea d d r e s s e di nt e nd i erent questions, attention is given to changes
in lending standards, to the factors responsible for these changes, and to credit conditions
and terms applied to customers — i.e., whether, why and how banks change lending stan-
8Berg, van Rixtel, Ferrando, de Bondt and Scopel (2005) describe in detail the setup of the survey.
Sauer (2009) and Hempell, Köhler-Ulbrich and Sauer (2009) provide an update including the most recent
developments and the few changes implemented (request of additional information via ad-hoc questions).
The survey was ﬁrst used for research purposes in Maddaloni and Peydró (2009) and Maddaloni, Peydró
and Scopel (2009).
9This classiﬁcation is somewhat dierent from the classiﬁcation used in the US for the Senior Loan
O!cer Survey where mortgage loans are further disentangled in prime and subprime loans.
10As we have access to information on banks’ size, an interesting hypothesis stemming from the bank
lending channel is that the credit channel may be stronger for small banks. We postpone this analysis to
future investigation.
11At the start, there were 87 banks answering the survey. This ﬁgure remained almost ﬁxed until 2007,
when Slovenia entered the euro area and Slovenian banks entered in the survey. Successively, in 2008, this
ﬁgure reached 112 with the inclusion of Cyprus, Malta and an enlarged sample for Italy and Germany.15
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dards. Concerning demand for loans, there are mainly two questions, one related to the
demand received from each type of borrower, and the other related to the factors aecting
loan demand (investment needs, access to other sources of ﬁnance, etc.).12
The ﬁrst set of questions ask about changes in lending standards for each type of bor-
rower (ﬁrms and households, for house purchase and for consumption). Lending standards
are the internal guidelines or criteria for a bank’s loan policy (see Loan and Morgan, 2006,
and Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Two dierent questions, referring to ﬁrms and house-
holds, ask if banks changed lending standards over the previous quarter (or they expect
to change them in the following quarter).13 The successive set of questions give banks the
opportunity to assess how speciﬁc factors aected their credit standards. In particular,
whether the changes in standards were due to changes in bank balance-sheet capacity,
to changes in competitive pressures, or to changes in borrowers’ creditworthiness and net
worth. Finally, the last set of questions concerns changes in the terms and conditions
of loans — the contractual obligations agreed upon by banks and borrowers, such as the
interest rate, the loan collateral, size, maturity and covenants.
The Euro area results of the survey (which are a weighted average of the results ob-
tained for each Euro area country) are published every quarter on the website of the ECB
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html). In very few
countries the aggregate answers of the domestic samples are published by the respec-
tive national central banks. However, the overall sample including all the answers at the
country and bank level is conﬁdential.
For the purpose of this paper we concentrate only on few questions from the BLS
that we describe in detail in the Appendix. Since we aim at identifying shocks to credit
supply and demand — bank and borrowers’ balance-sheet channels — we concentrate on the
questions related to whether lending standards have changed, which factors have aected
the decision, and on the loan demand received by banks. Moreover, since we are interested
in actual lending decisions by banks and we are also comparing the results of the analysis
in the Euro area and in the US (see section 2.2), we analyze the answers related to actual
changes in lending standards over the previous three months and we do not use answers
related to expected changes.14
12The factors that change loan demand also contain some useful information. An interesting hypothesis
to check in the future is whether the economic impact of the credit channel is higher when loan demand
increases, due to limited access to other ﬁnancing sources.
13In cases when foreign banks are part of the sample, the credit standards refer to the loans’ policy in
the domestic market which may dier from guidelines established for the headquarter bank.
14The answers related to the factors which induced changes in the lending standards applied by banks
(i.e. why banks have tightened lending standards) further strengthen the identiﬁcation of loan supply
restrictions. These factors can be categorized in two main groups: (1) factors linked to the ability of banks
to lend in relation with their balance sheet constraints and the competitive pressures; (2) factors linked to16
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To use a balanced panel, we restrict the analysis to the 12 countries which comprised
the Euro area at the inception of the survey (2002:Q4). The answers cover the period
from 2002:Q4 to 2009:Q4. Over this period we consistently have quarterly data for 12
Euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain).
2.2 The Senior Loan O!cer Survey
The Federal Reserve publishes every quarter the results of a survey on bank lending
standards, the Senior Loan O!cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (SLO).
The Survey covers both business and household loans.
The questionnaire focuses on supply of and demand for bank loans, but the focus is
on past developments and there are no regular questions on expectations. Since 1990 the
o!cers are reporting separately on lending standards for small and large ﬁrms (as well
as demand). We generally use in our benchmark analysis the answers related to large
enterprises.15
The current sample is composed of around 60 banks, usually the largest in each of
the 12 Federal Reserve Districts. The Survey is conducted by the district Federal Reserve
Banks involved. The response rate is virtually 100%. More information on the setup of
the survey is in Lown and Morgan (2006).16 The results of the survey are available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey.
Similar to the questions in the BLS, for business (C&I) loans, the SLO asks about
changes in lending standards and also the factors that have determined these decisions.
These factors are broadly related to bank balance-sheet positions, banking competition
factors, and borrower risk/outlook. Notably, the SLO contains a speciﬁc question on how
bank tolerance for risk has aected lending standards decision, an information that is not
reported in the BLS.17 Unfortunately, and dierently from the Euro area BLS, the SLO
changes in borrowers’ risk and net worth. In our setting the answers related to the ﬁrst group of factors
identiﬁes “pure” credit supply restrictions and, therefore, the bank lending channel. This information is
useful not only to disentangle the bank lending channel from the ﬁrm/household balance-sheet channel,
but also to strentghten the credit supply identiﬁcation (the eect over and above changes in loan demand
and borrower’s quality).
15The series on lending standards for large and small enterprises have a correlation of 96%. The series
on demand for loans from large and small enterprises have a correlation of 93%. For the Euro Area the
general question on ﬁrms refers to all ﬁrms, but then there are also questions referring to lending standards
applied to large and SME ﬁrms that we do not use in this paper.
16See also Lown, Morgan and Rohatgi (2000) and Lown and Morgan (2002).
17This information can be interpreted as a direct measure of banks’ appetite for risk in lending behaviour
in the US. While the BLS for the Euro Area does not provide a direct measure of banks’ risk appetite,
the richness of the survey information allow to extract this measure indirectly by controlling for the other17
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information on factors aecting changes in lending standards is not available for mortgage
and consumer loans but only for C&I loans.18
The survey was introduced for the ﬁrst time in 1967. Since then, however, the basic
structure of the Survey has changed several times. Therefore, the time series that can be
used for a comprehensive econometric analysis with consistent information of the survey
is considerably shorter. The questions related to the demand for business and households
loans, moreover, were included in the survey in 1992:Q3. Therefore, this is the starting
point of our analysis.19 For the purpose of this paper we concentrate only on few questions
from the SLO that we describe in detail in the Appendix.
2.3 Aggregate statistics for the BLS and the SLO
The questions asked in the Euro area BLS and in the US SLO allow for ﬁve possible
replies ranging from “eased considerably” to “tightened considerably” for the questions
related to changes in lending standards and from “decreased considerably” to “increased
considerably” for the questions related to the demand for loans.
Following for instance Lown and Morgan (2006), we quantify the dierent answers
by using net percentages.20 When measuring credit availability, the net percentage is the
dierence between the percentage of banks reporting a tightening of lending standards
and the percentage of banks reporting a softening of standards in each country. The net
percentage of banks that have changed standards due to factors linked to balance sheet
capacity provides a measure of (pure) credit supply. In both cases a positive value implies
that there has been a net tightening of standards.
For changes in the demand for loans, the net percentage is the dierence between the
percentage of banks reporting an increase in the demand for loans and the percentage of
banks reporting a decrease. In this case, a positive ﬁgure indicates a net increase in the
factors and by analysing the terms and conditions of the loans (see Maddaloni and Peydró, 2009).
18In addition, some of the questions about the factors aecting changes in lending standards in the SLO
were added only in recent years, which further restrict the use of these answers over the entire time period
that we are using for the US.
19Questions related to the demand for consumer loans were included only in 1995Q4.
20The use of this statistic implies that no distinction is made for the degree of tightening (easing) of
lending standards in the replies (similarly on the degree of increase in the demand for loans). This issue
can be addressed using diusion indexes. A simple way of calculating these indexes consists for example in
weighting by 0.5 the percentage of banks answering that they have tightened somewhat (eased somewhat)
and in weighting by 1 the percentage of banks that have tightened considerably (eased considerably). A
similar weighting scheme can be applied to the answers concerning demand for loans. The results obtained
using diusion indexes do not dier qualitatively from the results obtained with net percentages and,
therefore, we do not report them since they also imply a certain level of discretion when choosing the
weights.18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1228
July 2010
demand for loans. Figures 1 and 2 (Panel A) plot the euro area aggregate and the US
ﬁgures respectively for total demand, lending standards, “(pure) credit supply” (i.e. the
sum of bank balance-sheet constraints and competitive pressures) and borrower’s quality.
The respondents of the survey assess at the same time supply and demand conditions
in the banking market and, therefore, their answers may be highly (negatively) correlated.
However, a simple correlation analysis of the answers related to supply and demand of
credit at the country level show that they are not perfectly correlated and the correlation
is signiﬁcantly low when the answers refer to “pure supply” channels. Figure A in the
appendix clarify this issue. The three graphs report the correlation between total loan
demand and (i) total credit availability (changes in overall lending standards for ﬁrms),
(ii) supply factors related to borrowers’ quality (economic conditions and risk/outlook of
ﬁrms) and (iii) “pure credit supply” (factors related to banks’ balance-sheet strength and to
competitive pressures). Both for the US and for the Euro area the correlation between loan
demand and supply of credit identiﬁed through the survey answers signiﬁcantly decreases
when supply is identiﬁed via “pure” supply factors — stemming from the bank lending
channel. In these cases the correlations are never higher than 40 percent.21
2.4 Macroeconomic data
In addition to the loan information from central banks, we include in the analysis three
macroeconomic variables: aggregate output, prices and monetary policy rates. The output
variable is the four-quarter growth rate of real GDP for each Euro area country and
for the US. Developments in prices are proxied by the four-quarter growth rate of the
GDP deﬂator. Finally, the monetary policy interest rate is the overnight money market
rate (EONIA) for the Euro area and the eective Federal Funds Rate for the US. In
the US the Fed Funds Rate has been extensively used as an indicator of the stance of
monetary policy (see for example Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov
(1997), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and den Haan et al. (2007)). In the
Euro area the Governing Council of the ECB determines a corridor within which the
EONIA rate ﬂuctuates (between a deposit facility rate and a marginal lending facility
rate). Therefore, this rate proxies for the stance of Euro area monetary policy.
In October 2008 the ECB has reduced the policy rate and also introduced a credit
enhancement measure, providing liquidity to banks through ﬁxed-rate full allotment auc-
tions. This policy has made the overnight rate (EONIA) signiﬁcantly lower than the policy
rate (ECB, 2009). Therefore, we consider EONIA as the measure of monetary policy in
21Results are similar if correlations are computed with loans to households in the euro area. The same
detailed infomation is not available for the US SLO.19
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the Euro area for the whole period, even after September 2008.22 For the sake of sym-
metry we consider the Federal Funds Rate as the measure of monetary policy for the US,
even though the Fed implemented a variety of actions during the crisis (Bernanke, 2009,
and ECB, 2009), thus making the US overnight rate a possibly incomplete measure of the
monetary policy stance. Our main results remain however robust to a sample ending in
September 2008.
At ﬁrst instance, we have also included in the VAR the volume of loans as in Lown
and Morgan (2006) or den Haan et al. (2007). However, the use of both loan demand
and supply answers from the lending surveys with their detailed classiﬁcation and richness
of information makes the volume and prices (lending rates) of loans redundant in the
speciﬁcation. In these (non-reported) estimations, shocks to what we identify as loan
demand and supply for all categories have always the correct impact on the respective
actual loan variables without substantially modifying the results for the other variables.
2.5 Empirical methodology
We embed the rich information on lending standards and demand within an otherwise
standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
\w = D(O)\w31 + %w (1)
where w =1 >==>W denotes time, \w is an p—dimensional vector of endogenous variables,
D(O) is a matrix polynomial of order s in the lag operator O,a n d%w is a vector of
white noise residuals. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), we assume \w =
[\ 0
1w>u w>\0
2w]0 where \1w is a (n1 × 1) vector with elements whose contemporaneous values
are in the information set of central bank, uw is the monetary policy rate, i.e. the Federal
Funds rate for the US and the EONIA rate for the Euro area, and \2w is a (n2 × 1) vector
with elements whose contemporaneous values are not in the information set of the central
bank.
W h i l ef o rt h eU St h ea v a i l a b l et i m es e r i e sc o v e ra l m o s tt w e n t yy e a r so fq u a r t e r l y
observations (1992:3-2009:4), for the Euro area the sample is rather short (2002:4-2009:4).
Therefore, for the Euro area we estimate a VAR on a panel data set from the 12 countries
comprising the Euro area in 2002, with a ﬁxed-eects approach. This allows to pool
22As a robustness check, in non-reported analysis we have also used the 3-month Euribor rate and the
overnight interest swap rate on EONIA (OIS). These measures carry additional information compared with
the overnight rates and, therefore, the results obtained may be more di!cult to interpret. The 3-month
Euribor is an interbank rate and therefore reﬂects also a component of credit risk. On the other hand, the
OIS rate is a proxy of expectations of monetary policy, but it may also be aected by liquidity in the swap
market.20
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diverse information from all countries, while controlling for heterogeneity in the constant
term.23 The estimation of the VAR is Bayesian, assuming a ﬂat prior on the parameters
and normality of the error terms (see e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997).
In all speciﬁcations, the vector \w is composed of three sets of variables: the macroeco-
nomic variables (GDP growth and inﬂation), the credit variables and the monetary policy
rate. We structure the analysis using four dierent speciﬁcations. In this way we take into
account the availability of data for the euro and for the US (across time and borrowers)
and provide results to be seen against the available evidence on the credit channel. In
particular, we consider the following speciﬁcations:
• Model 1: the credit variables include only changes in total demand and total supply
of business loans
• Model 2: the credit variables include total demand and total credit availability for
all loan categories, i.e. non-ﬁnancial corporations, mortgages and consumer credit
• Model 3: the credit variables include total demand, “pure” credit supply (bank lend-
ing channel) and borrower risks relative only to ﬁrms (ﬁrm balance-sheet channel)
• Model 4: the credit variables include total demand, “pure” credit supply (bank
lending channel) and borrower risks relative to all loan categories (ﬁrm and household
balance-sheet channel)
The speciﬁcation in Model 1 is used for the sake of comparability with the previous
literature (see, in particular, Lown and Morgan, 2006). The remaining models help qualify
the various components of the credit channel and, in particular, Model 3 and 4 truly isolate
the credit supply channel. However, because of lack of data, they are restricted either to
business loans (Model 3) or to Euro area data (Model 4). All VAR speciﬁcations include
one lag for each variable.
For the identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock, we follow a standard approach (see
for example Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999). Unlike the previous literature,
however, which typically orders the credit variables after the policy rates in the VAR and
includes the credit variables in the \2w vector, we assume that the monetary authority
responds to all contemporaneous (i.e. quarterly) information. This identiﬁcation of the
monetary policy shock takes into account the forward looking character of the survey.
23Even though there is no o!cial CEPR dating of the Euro area business cycle after the 1990s, the
Euro area four-quarter growth rates of GDP shows the features of a complete cycle from 2002 to 2009.
Heterogeneity across countries are nevertheless su!cient to ensure reliable estimates from a panel strategy,
while ex-post tests do not reject our common slope assumption in the panel. Hence, there is enough
heterogeneity in the Euro area to exploit a panel but not so much that prevents pooling.21
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It assumes that central banks observes not only current output and prices, but also the
current responses of loan o!cers when deciding on the policy rate. Therefore, all these
variables do not change at time w in response to a time w policy shock, and the policy
rate is ordered after both the macro and the credit variables. In other words, in our
setup the subset \2w is empty.24 Nevertheless, we conduct several robustness checks using
dierent ordering of variables in \w and the results obtained are robust to the dierent
speciﬁcations.
For the identiﬁcation of the credit shocks, as already remarked above, we trust the
bankers and interpret their assessment as truthfully reﬂecting conditions in the bank credit
markets. Consequently, we interpret an innovation to the answers related to demand for
loans as a shock to credit demand, and an innovation to total lending standards as a shock
to credit availability (broad credit channel). Furthermore, we interpret an innovation to
change of credit standards due to banks’ changes in balance-sheet strength and competition
as a measure of credit supply (bank lending channel), and an innovation to change of credit
standards due to ﬁrms’ (households’) changes in balance-sheet strength as a measure of
borrower’s quality (ﬁrm/household balance-sheet channel). All the results are quite robust
and generally invariant to dierent ordering of the credit variables.25
Figures 1B and 2B plot the shocks to pure supply as estimated from the model and
the actual pure credit supply from the surveys (average of the responses related to bank
balance sheet constraints and competition factors). It is important to note that shocks
to pure supply mimic well over time the developments in related lending standards in the
Euro area. In particular, the years 2004 to 2006 in which lending standards were relaxed
due mainly to competition pressures, and the period starting in August 2007 when lending
standards were tightened because of bank liquidity and capital problems (see Figure 1B).
Conversely, in the US, shocks to pure supply do not mimic well lending standards related
to pure credit supply suggesting that the available data from the SLO are not su!cient
to disentangle the sub-channels of the broad credit channel (bank lending and borrower
balance sheet channel) (see Figure 2B).
24The choice of this ordering is especially justiﬁable in the Euro Area, where the monetary policy strategy
is based on a two-pillar approach and explicitly takes into account information from credit aggregates.
25Similar deﬁnitions have been also used in a recent paper by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) who
consider as loan supply both subchannels of the credit channel. However, it may still be argued that
the ﬁrm or household balance sheet channels are due to changes in the quality of loan applications and,
therefore, they are part of the demand channel. A measure of (pure) credit supply is therefore preferable
to better disentangle the various channels.22
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3R e s u l t s
We present the results in three main subsections. First, we analyze the full dynamics of
the credit channel. We discuss the responses of the system to three shocks — monetary
policy, loan demand and total credit availability. Moreover, we perform some counterfac-
tual experiments to validate the existence and strength of the credit channel of monetary
policy transmission, and quantify the relative importance of loan demand and supply.
Second, we focus on the existence and relevance of the sub-channels of the credit channel:
the bank-lending (“pure” credit supply) and the (non-ﬁnancial) borrower balance-sheet
channels (ﬁrms and households). Also in this case we run counterfactual experiments to
quantify the relative contribution of the sub-channels. Finally, building on the methodol-
ogy developed, we perform a shock decomposition of GDP growth during the crisis period
(2007Q3-2009Q4). Based on this analysis we can assess the implications of monetary
policy interventions and credit supply constraints on the real economy during the latest
crisis.
To address the issues outlined above, the analysis is performed using four speciﬁcations
of the VAR model including dierent credit variables (see Section 2.5). The results are
presented by means of impulse response functions. All the responses shown are normalized
by dividing for their innovation variances. Therefore they can be compared on a single
scale. We show the median response along with 68 (dark blue) and 90 (light blue) percent
Bayesian credible intervals, computed by estimating the VAR with a ﬂat prior on the para-
meters and assuming normality of the error terms (see e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997).
The panel VAR for the Euro area is estimated assuming ﬁxed eects, slope homogeneity
and the same identiﬁcation assumptions for each country.
3.1 The dynamics of the credit channel
In this section we discuss the existence of a credit channel of monetary policy and its
importance for the transmission of shocks. First, we look at the impact of a monetary
policy shock on loan supply and demand. Next, we assess the eect of a credit avail-
ability shock on aggregate output and prices. Finally, we quantify the size of the credit
channel and report the ampliﬁcation impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP growth
and inﬂation due to credit variables by means of appropriately designed counterfactual
experiments. In the counterfactual analysis we report the 68 percent Bayesian credible
intervals of the impulse responses computed in the full system and the median responses
under the counterfactual experiment.23
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3.1.1 Loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations (Model 1)
We start by considering only information from the banking surveys related to business
loans and we use only the answers related to total loan demand and total lending standards
(broad credit channel). This is Model 1, as described in Section 2.5. The results obtained
with this model speciﬁcation can be compared directly to most of the available evidence on
the credit channel which has focused mainly on business loans (see Bernanke and Gertler,
1995; and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996, and the references cited therein). The
results can also be compared with what Lown and Morgan (2006) report, using lending
standards from the SLO in a VAR model.
Figure 3A shows the response of the demand for and of the (broad) supply of business
loans — as proxied by the correspondent responses from the BLS and the SLO — to a
one-standard deviation monetary policy shock. Demand for loans declines in response to
an increase of the short-term interest rate in both economies. Loan supply is restricted
when monetary policy is tightened (a higher value for loan supply means tighter credit
standards).26 In the Euro area the restriction to loan supply due to a monetary policy
shock is signiﬁcantly higher than the decline in loan demand, suggesting that monetary
policy aects loan supply more than loan demand at least business loans. In the US, the
opposite happens and loan demand is aected more than loan supply. Another impor-
tant ﬁnding is that loan supply restrictions in response to a monetary policy shock are
signiﬁcantly higher in the Euro area than in the US, despite the size of the increase in the
short-term interest rate is larger in the US.27
Figure 3B shows the responses of GDP growth and inﬂation to a shock to the bank
credit variables (demand for and supply of business loans). A positive shock to credit
availability (net tightening) implies lower GDP growth and lower inﬂation in Euro area.
A negative shock to demand has similar eects. In the US the direction of the impacts is
similar, but only a tightening of credit availability to ﬁrms has a signiﬁcant eect on GDP
growth and inﬂation, whereas the impacts from a loan demand shock are not statistically
signiﬁcant. However, the reduction of GDP growth due to a shock to credit availability
is signiﬁcantly higher in the US than in the Euro area. All in all these results suggest
that a credit channel of monetary policy transmission is active in both economies. Tighter
monetary policy restricts bank loan supply to ﬁrms. In turn, lower credit availability
reduces both output growth and inﬂation.
We take a next step and quantify the relevance of the credit channel for the transmission
mechanism. In particular we would like to address the following questions: (i) Do credit
26These results for the US are similar to what reported by Lown and Morgan (2006).
27A one-standard deviation shock corresponds to an increase of the short-term interest rate of around
6 0b a s i sp o i n t si nt h eU . S .a n do f3 0b a s i sp o i n t si nt h eE u r oa r e a .24
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variables amplify the eect of a monetary policy shock on GDP growth and inﬂation? (ii)
If yes, what is the mechanism through which the ampliﬁcation works? In other words, is
the ampliﬁcation due to induced changes in loan demand, in loan supply or in both?
We answer these questions with simple counterfactual experiments. In Figure 3C we
compare the response of GDP growth and inﬂation to a monetary policy shock when both
the loan demand and the broad loan supply channels are activated (grey interval) with
the median responses obtained when the channels are closed down (black line).28
Credit availability is important in amplifying the transmission of a monetary policy
shock on output and prices in both economic areas. The impacts on the variables of
interest (GDP growth and inﬂation) in a system where the loan supply has been closed
down (the counterfactuals) are signiﬁcantly dierent in magnitude and timing from the
responses obtained in a full system, particularly in the Euro area. The impact of a shock of
monetary policy on GDP growth when the credit channel is active is also higher in the Euro
area. This result underlines the importance of bank loans for the ﬁnancing of the private
sector in the Euro area, as opposed to the US, where other ﬁnancial intermediaries (for
mortgage loans in particular) and ﬁnancial markets (for business loans) play an important
role (see Allen et al., 2004).
The results when the credit channel is shut down are quantitatively in line with the
previous literature analyzing the impact of monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic
variables. The GDP response is signiﬁcantly negative and remains negative for almost
four years (the x-axes measures quarters). It displays the usual hump-shaped dynamics
with a peak occurring between one and two years in both economic areas. The response
of inﬂation shows a short-lived but not signiﬁcant (in size) price puzzle, a result common
to most related literature (see Christiano et al., 1999; or den Haan et al., 2007; Altavilla
and Ciccarelli, 2009). Hence, the results suggest that when the credit channel is active
monetary policy shocks have a signiﬁcantly higher impact on aggregate output and prices.
Note ﬁnally that the results are robust to the exclusion of the crisis period from the
estimation sample. We have performed the same analysis over a shorter sample (up until
the third quarter of 2008) so to exclude the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, and results do not point to a weaker credit channel.
28We report responses to a 100 basis points monetary policy shock. The Bayesian credible intervals in
grey represent the responses in a system where all the channels are active. The black lines are the median
responses computed from a system where the supply or the demand channel has been closed down. We
perform the exercise by choosing a sequence of supply or demand shocks which exactly neutralizes the
impact of the monetary policy shock on the supply or demand variables.25
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3.1.2 NFC, mortgage and consumer loans (Model 2)
Business loans are only a fraction of bank loans and, as already pointed out by Bernanke
et al. (1996), there are reasons to believe that the transmission through the credit channel
may be more relevant for mortgage and consumer loans than for business loans. In addi-
tion, Den Haan et al. (2007) point out the importance of the whole portfolio allocation of
bank loans when analyzing a monetary tightening, as the volume of loans to dierent bor-
rowers (business, consumer and real estate) may react dierently to a short-term interest
rate shock because banks strategically decide to reallocate their loan portfolio in response
to changes in monetary conditions.
To take these issues into consideration, we include in the VAR model the demand and
the supply for the dierent types of loans (business, mortgage and consumer loans) as
in the speciﬁcation of Model 2 (see Section 2.5). The information on consumer loans is
available in the US SLO only since 1996, which greatly reduces the time series available
for the analysis. As a result, the estimation results obtained tend to be less robust when
including the answers relative to consumer loans. Therefore for the US we show the
impulse responses obtained when including only business and mortgage loans.
Figure 4A shows the responses of loan demand and supply to a monetary policy shock
for all types of loans in the Euro area and in the US. The level and timing of credit
availability reduction is signiﬁcant and similar across dierent type of loans, whereas there
are dierences in the responses of loan demand. In the Euro area the reaction of loan
demand for mortgages is stronger than for other loans, whereas in the US the response
is not statistically signiﬁcant. This may, at least in part, reﬂect dierent institutional
characteristics of the mortgage credit markets. For instance, other (non commercial bank)
ﬁnancial intermediaries are important providers of mortgage loans in the US while this
is not the case in (most) Euro area countries; the ratio of ﬁxed to variable loan rates is
dierent in the two economies; conditions for reﬁnancing mortgage loans tend to be more
favorable in the US compared to (most) Euro area countries.29
These results suggest that the responses to a monetary policy shock of volumes of
dierent kind of loans as reported in den Haan et al.. (2007) with US data may reﬂect
changes in loan demand more than in loan supply. In the results of den Haan et al. (2007),
a monetary tightening has a dampening impact only on real estate and consumer loans.
29Over the past two decades institutional changes in the US mortgage market have made particularly
e!cient the reﬁnancing process with the growth of the reﬁnancing business. This has made it easier for
homeowners to reﬁnance their mortgage to take advantage of declining interest rates. While the information
from bank lending surveys refer to new loans - therefore not directly related to reﬁnancing activity - it is
likely that the ﬂexibility oered to homeowners has weakened the link between the demand for loans and
the level of interest rates. For a recent discusssion on the characteristics of the US mortgage market see
for example Khandani, Lo and Merton (2009).26
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Our results, instead, suggest that while the responses to a monetary policy shock across
dierent type of borrowers dier somewhat in size and in timing, the direction of the
shock is the same for all type of loans. These dierences are likely to reﬂect the dierent
identiﬁcation strategy for loan demand and supply that we use in our study.
The next step is to analyze the impact of shocks to credit variables on GDP growth
and inﬂation. Figure 4B plots the responses of these variables to a tightening of credit
in the Euro area and in the US. A shock to credit availability dampens GDP growth in
both economies, with responses to business and mortgage loans restrictions being more
signiﬁcant than those to consumers’ credit, possibly as a consequence of the relatively low
importance of this segment of the credit market in most Euro area countries. Response of
GDP growth is higher to shocks to the supply of business loans in the Euro area and to
mortgage loans in the US. On the other hand, shocks to demand for mortgage loans have
higher impact on GDP growth in both areas. The impact on inﬂation is more subdued.
In the US this may be related to the high uncertainty surrounding the estimates in this
speciﬁcation. In the Euro area a shock to credit availability for mortgage loans dampens
inﬂation almost immediately, whereas a restriction to the supply of business loans to ﬁrms
has a higher but more delayed impact.
Counterfactual analysis All in all the results presented so far show that tighter mon-
etary policy restricts credit availability to all type of borrowers both in the US and in
the Euro area, albeit with some dierences in the intensity and in the timing of the im-
pacts. In turn, restrictions to credit signiﬁcantly reduce output growth and inﬂation. This
ﬁrst evidence, therefore, suggests that a credit channel of monetary policy transmission is
active and works through all the lending channels (loans to dierent borrowers).
As we have done for Model 1, we now quantify the relevance of the credit channel in a
framework where all the dierent classes of borrowers are taken into account. In addition
to the questions we have addressed using Model 1, the speciﬁcation of Model 2 raises two
additional issues. First, we can check which borrower category is more relevant for the
transmission of monetary policy shocks. Second, as restrictions to loan supply may aect
GDP growth and inﬂation by dampening loan demand (which in turn ampliﬁes the impact
on the economy), we can also check the relevance of this indirect channel.30
30An anonymous referee has rightly pointed out that movements along the demand curve should not be
confused with shifts of the demand curve. Clearly a restriction to loan supply will result in an equilibrium
with higher rates and lower demand and not necessarily in a shift of the demand curve. A movement
along the demand curve (an equilibrium with lower demand and higher lending rate) should be included
in the response of demand to a monetary policy shock On the other hand, loan supply may be restricted
by tightening terms and conditions of loans other than the price of the loans (collateral requirements,
loan-to-value ratio, size and maturity). These conditions would be translated in a shift of the demand27
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The analysis is carried out using counterfactual experiments. We address the ﬁrst
question by looking at the impact on GDP growth and inﬂation of a monetary policy
shock when the demand and the supply channels for each type of loans are closed down.
The results are shown in Figure 4C, where we compare the dynamics of the responses of
output growth and inﬂation to a monetary policy shock (grey interval) with counterfactual
of responses of the same variables obtained when closing down either the loan supply or
the loan demand for each type of loans (black line).31
The ﬁgures show that in the Euro area a monetary policy shock has a high impact
on GDP growth by changing demand and supply for mortgage loans and loan supply
for business loans, whereas in the US results are not statistically conclusive, although in
median terms supply (of both business and mortgage loans) seems to matter more than
demand. In the Euro area, when considering the eect on inﬂation, demand more than
supply seem to be important across all loan categories. Demand for consumer loans,
which do not matter for the transmission of a monetary policy shock to GDP growth, are
somewhat relevant for the transmission of the shock to inﬂation.
Finally, in Figure 4D we check the indirect channel of monetary transmission. The
ﬁgures show the results of counterfactual experiments where the full-system impact of a
credit tightening (shock to credit availability) on output growth and inﬂation is compared
with the responses of the same variables when closing down the demand channel. The
evidence indicates that the tightening of bank loan supply has a signiﬁcant direct impact
on GDP growth, and that the indirect eect working through demand is only somewhat
signiﬁcant on both GDP growth and inﬂation for mortgage loans in the Euro area, and
slightly modiﬁes the dynamics of inﬂation in US for business loans.
3.2 Firm and household balance-sheet versus bank-lending channel
In this subsection we disentangle the two main sub-channels of the credit channel of
the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, we assess the relative importance of
the mechanisms of transmission of monetary policy shocks through the balance sheets of
banks and borrowers (the bank lending channel and the non-ﬁnancial borrower balance
sheet channel).
To identify these channels we use the rich information provided by the surveys, in
particular the answers related to the factors (reasons) inducing banks to change their
lending standards to ﬁrms and households. We categorize these factors in two broad sets.
curve (lower demand at the same level of lending rate). However, more than discriminate between these
two eects, our aim here is only to assess how much of the supply shock is dynamically transmitted to the
GDP growth through demand, regardless of whether demand itself has shifted or not.
31See footnote 29.28
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The pure supply factors are related to the capital and liquidity positions of the banks,
their ability to access market ﬁnancing and to the competitive pressures in the banking
sector (stemming also from non-bank intermediaries). These factors aect the ability and
incentives of banks to grant loans given a certain quality of the borrowers. Therefore,
these factors provide a measure of the importance of the bank lending channel. The latest
ﬁnancial crises has emphasized the need to understand deeply these mechanisms in light
also of the policies put in place to support the banking sector (see e.g. the forthcoming
chapters in the Handbook of Monetary Policy, in particular Adrian and Shin, 2009; Boivin
et al., 2009; and Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2009).
The factors related to the borrowers’ quality are instead linked to the outlook for ﬁrms
and households and to the quality of their collateral. Therefore, they are more related to
the willingness of banks to lend to borrowers with dierent risk proﬁles, hence reﬂecting
dierent agency problems (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1996 and 1999). We use
these factors as indicators of the relevance of the (non-ﬁnancial borrower) balance sheet
channels.
Note that in this context there is an important dierence between the two bank lending
surveys. In the Euro area BLS there is information on the reasons why banks have changed
lending standards both for business and household loans, whereas in the US SLO this
information is available only for business loans. As a consequence, we can analyze the
household balance-sheet channel only for the Euro area. In the next subsections, ﬁrst we
analyze the ﬁrm balance-sheet channel and the bank lending channel for both the US and
the Euro area (Model 3). Next, we analyze the household and ﬁrm balance-sheet channels
for the Euro area and we compare their strength with the bank lending channel (Model
4).
3.2.1 Firm balance-sheet channel and bank lending channel (Model 3)
Figure 5A shows the responses to a monetary policy shock of demand and supply for
business loans in the Euro area and in the US. The response of loan supply is further
disentangled between the eect working through the bank lending channel and the ﬁrm
balance-sheet channel. In the Euro area a monetary tightening reduces loan supply through
the bank lending channel (pure supply, banks tighten the standards because of bank bal-
ance sheet constraints and competitive pressures) and the ﬁrm balance-sheet channel (bor-
rower’s quality, banks tighten their standards because of higher ﬁrm risk, worsened out-
look and/or less valuable collateral). The responses are signiﬁcantly estimated and show a
comparable positive impact (tightened credit standards) but a somewhat dierent timing
(the impact peaks around one quarter earlier for the transmission through the pure credit
supply channel). In the US, responses are subject to a higher degree of uncertainty. Nev-29
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ertheless the estimates show that the impact of a monetary tightening aects signiﬁcantly
the bank lending channel at 68% of conﬁdence, while the response of factors related to
ﬁrms’ quality is generally not signiﬁcant.
Figure 5B plots the responses of GDP growth and inﬂation to a shock to bank pure
supply and ﬁrms’ quality factors for the Euro area and for the US. In the Euro area the
two loan supply channels are signiﬁcantly aecting GDP growth and — to a lesser extent —
inﬂation, with a comparable lag: the responses of output growth peak between three and
four quarters, whereas the responses of inﬂation reach a maximum approximately after
ﬁve to six quarters. In terms of magnitude, the impact on GDP growth and inﬂation of
shocks to the pure supply (bank lending) channel is on average twice as big as the eect
of shocks to ﬁrm’s quality.
In the US only shocks to the ﬁrm’s quality (ﬁrm balance sheet channel) have a signiﬁ-
cant impact on GDP, while the responses to pure credit supply shocks are not signiﬁcant.
This dierence between the responses in the Euro area and in the US may reﬂect dier-
ences in the banking structure of the two economies. In particular, the corporate sector
in the US is less reliant on bank loans, and thus restrictions of ﬁrms’ access to bank credit
may have a lower impact on GDP growth (see Allen et al., 2004).
Overall, these results conﬁrm that both a ﬁrm balance-sheet and a bank-lending chan-
nel play a signiﬁcant role in the transmission mechanism in the Euro area and in the US
at least concerning the impact on GDP growth. To further investigate and better quantify
the relative importance of the two channels, we use counterfactual experiments, similar to
the ones performed in the previous sections. We analyze which factors amplify more the
responses of output growth and inﬂation to a monetary policy shock. Figure 5C shows the
results of this analysis. In the Euro area the eect on GDP growth of a monetary policy
shock is ampliﬁed by credit supply changes (the bank lending channel) slightly more than
by the eect working through ﬁrm’s quality (balance-sheet channel). The eect on inﬂa-
tion is also higher through the pure supply channel and through the loan demand channel.
On the other hand, in the US the ﬁrm balance-sheet and the loan demand channels seem
on average important for both GDP and inﬂation.
Our assessment on the importance of the bank lending channel in the US and in the
Euro area provide some support to the dierent policies that were implemented during
the ﬁnancial crisis. In the US the central bank has implemented policies directed to sup-
port both banks and ﬁrms (for example by intervening in the commercial paper market),
whereas in the Euro area interventions have mainly targeted banks — the credit enhance-
ment implemented by the ECB.30
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3.2.2 All subchannels including the household balance-sheet channel (Model
4)
In the last VAR speciﬁcation considered, we include loan demand, pure supply and bor-
rower’s quality channels for all borrowers: ﬁrms, mortgages and consumer loans. This
speciﬁcation (Model 4 in section 2.5) is used to analyze the importance of the transmis-
sion channels working through the balance sheet of banks and non-ﬁnancial borrowers
(banks, ﬁrms and households, respectively). As observed earlier, we can do this analysis
only for the Euro area since we have information from the BLS on whether changes in
lending standards for households (either for house purchase or for consumption) are due
to changes in pure credit supply factors (bank balance sheet constraints and competitive
pressures) or to changes in households’ quality (outlook and risk of collateral).
Figure 6A shows the responses to a monetary tightening of loan demand and loan
supply to ﬁrms and households through the bank lending and the non-ﬁnancial borrower
balance-sheet channels. A monetary tightening reduces loan supply through the bank
lending channel (pure supply) and also through the ﬁrm and household balance-sheet
channels. The responses are signiﬁcant and show a comparable positive impact (tightened
credit standards) with peaks around four to ﬁve quarters and similar magnitudes. The
responses are broadly similar across type of loans.
Figure 6B shows the responses of GDP growth and inﬂation to shocks to loan supply for
ﬁrms and households (through the bank lending and the borrower balance-sheet channels).
Concerning the impact on GDP growth, the results relative to the bank lending channel
for ﬁrms (pure credit supply restrictions for loans to ﬁrms) are similar to what shown
in Figures 5B. The restrictions to supply for consumer loans is not very relevant. For
loans for house purchase the household balance-sheet channel is more important than the
(household) bank lending channel. This implies that shocks to the supply of mortgages
are relevant for GDP growth because of mechanisms working through households’ quality
channels. This is consistent with arguments put forward in Bernanke et al. (1996), who
point out that households may be more ﬁnancially constrained due to human capital
inalienability (see also Hart and Moore 1994), implying that monetary policy has stronger
eects through household loans.
The results for inﬂation suggest also a dierence across lending markets. The impact
on inﬂation is more signiﬁcant for business loans through the bank lending channel. On the
other hand, credit to households aects inﬂation by channels working through borrower’s
quality and demand. These results may have interesting policy implications. Policies
aimed at sustaining aggregate demand and improving balance sheet of non-ﬁnancial bor-
rowers may be more eective in supporting the credit markets for mortgages. However,31
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they may also have more impact on inﬂation.
To assess the relevance of the dierent channels of transmission of credit supply we
run a counterfactual analysis as done in the previous sections (Figure 6C). All in all the
results conﬁrm that in terms of impact on GDP growth, the bank lending channel is more
important for business loans and the household balance-sheet channel is more important
for mortgage loans. It is interesting to note that in Figure 5C the dierence between the
impact on GDP growth of restrictions to supply stemming from the bank lending and
the borrower balance sheet channel was less than what shown in Figure 6C. These latest
results therefore suggest that an unbiased assessment of the relative importance of the
transmission channels can be performed only considering all type of loans in the model.
Finally, demand for all type of loans and pure supply channel for business loans generate
signiﬁcant eects on inﬂation.
3.3 The ﬁnancial crisis
In this section, we use the VAR speciﬁcation to analyze the relative importance of dierent
shocks during the ﬁnancial crises and to shed some light on the relationship between the
ﬁnancial sector and the macroeconomy (in crises periods). Speciﬁcally, we assess the role
played by the impairment of the ﬁnancial sector and the consequent credit crunch on
the real economy and also the eectiveness of monetary policy interventions — primarily
reduction of policy rates.
We report in Figure 7A a shock decomposition for both economies using the speciﬁ-
cation of Model 2. The bars in the charts represent the eects at time w of innovations to
other variables which explain movements in GDP growth.32
In the Euro area, apart from the own shocks, changes in GDP growth were mostly
aected by restrictions of bank loan supply to business loans, in particular during the
ﬁnancial crisis. Therefore, the impairment of the ﬁnancial sector due to the crisis has
aected credit availability to ﬁrms (loans with average shorter maturity) and this, in turn,
had a negative impact on GDP growth. In the last quarters also the decline in demand for
mortgage loans reduced signiﬁcantly output growth. This is consistent with a deteriorating
outlook for the real economy which dampens demand for loans from the household sector.
At the same time, monetary policy shocks (primarily policy rate cuts but also indirectly
the full allotment policy implemented by the Eurosystem) have supported GDP growth,
which presumably would have been lower if an accommodative monetary policy stance had
32The decomposition at each time w is technically performed by estimating the VAR, projecting the
variables of interest over the crisis sample (2007Q3-2009Q4), and decomposing the dierence between the
realised and the projected values in the sum of the innovations to all variables between 2007Q3 and w. See,
e.g. Doan (2009) for more details.32
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not been put in place.33 The policies aimed at sustaining bank’s liquidity may have partly
relaxed liquidity constraints of banks and been conducive to less tight lending standards
than otherwise.
T h es a m ea n a l y s i sf o rt h eU Sy i e l d sq u a l i t a t i v e l yd i erent results. Apart from “own
shocks”, restrictions to the supply of mortgage loans are among the most important shocks
to explain changes in GDP growth over the period 2007Q3-2009Q4. Restrictions to the
supply of business loans are also important. At the same time, monetary policy shocks play
an almost neutral role. Concerning this result, the Fed has engaged in a diversiﬁed and
multifaceted strategy of non-conventional monetary policy measures, aimed at supporting
not only the ﬁnancial sector (by increasing the number of ﬁnancial institutions which could
draw on central bank liquidity and relaxing requirements on the quality of collateral) but
also the corporate sector, for example by buying commercial papers. This may partly
explain why restrictions to business loans play a minor role than in the Euro area, and
why shocks to the Fed Funds rate during the crisis period may not be able to capture fully
the importance of a monetary policy shock.
Finally, we investigate the relative importance of all the channels of loan supply. Figure
7B shows the shock decomposition using Model 4 for the Euro area (no comparable data
are available for the US). Apart from the own shock, the most important shock aecting
negatively GDP growth are credit supply restrictions to ﬁrms due to banks’ balance-sheet
constraints, i.e. the bank lending channel. This suggests that problems in bank capital
and liquidity and access to market ﬁnancing signiﬁcantly reduced GDP growth during the
ﬁnancial crisis, contributing to the economic recession.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Most developed countries around the world have experienced the worst banking crisis
of the post-war period. The global economic recession that has followed also appears
to be the most severe of this era. The role played by the banking sector in aecting the
macroeconomy, in particular through the supply of credit to the private sector, has become
a central issue of concerns for academics and policy makers alike. The issues of interest
revolve around three main questions: (i) whether balance sheet positions of banks aect
their lending decisions; (ii) whether this, in turn, has an impact on aggregate output and
inﬂation; and (iii) whether and how monetary policy impulses are transmitted to the rest
of the economy, in particular through banks. Our objective in this paper is to test the
credit channel of monetary transmission and to explore the dynamics of credit during the
current crisis.
33As explained in Section 3.4 the level of EONIA rate embeds also the eect of the full allottment policy.33
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There is a key identiﬁcation problem that the empirical literature on the credit channel
has to face: disentangling the eects of changes in loan demand and in loan supply, in par-
ticular the separation of the mechanisms related to the bank lending, the (non-ﬁnancial
borrower) balance-sheet, and the loan demand channels. Our identiﬁcation strategy is
based on the use of the answers from the conﬁdential Euro area Bank Lending Survey
and the US Senior Loan O!cer Survey. National central banks of the Eurosystem and
regional Feds carry out these surveys to gather quarterly information on the loan demand
that banks receive and on the lending standards that banks apply to ﬁrms and house-
holds, including the factors aecting banks’ decisions — bank balance sheet constraints
and borrowers’ quality factors.
Our results suggest that the credit channel is broadly operational for all type of chan-
nels and loans. In fact, the impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP is signiﬁcantly
stronger if the credit channel is accounted for in the model. Moreover, for the impact of
monetary policy on GDP, the bank lending channel is stronger than the loan demand and
the balance-sheet channel for ﬁrms, whereas the household balance-sheet channel and the
demand channels are stronger for households. Therefore, these ﬁndings imply that bank
loan supply should be included explicitly when modelling the linkages between monetary
policy, credit provision and the real economy. In turn, this is likely to amplify the mech-
anisms of the ﬁnancial accelerator (see Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010, vis-a-vis Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999). At the same time, our results also stress the importance
of an accurate calibration of the models, taking into account dierences across ﬁnancial
systems (we ﬁnd important dierences between the ee c t si nt h eE u r oa r e aa n di nt h e
US), as well as dierent lending markets (to ﬁrms and to households).
In the last part of the paper we also analyze whether the strong evidence we ﬁnd for the
credit channel is due to the occurrence of the ﬁnancial crisis. Our results are qualitatively
similar if we estimate the model until 2008:Q3, therefore taking out the period after the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. In addition, a shock decomposition of Euro area GDP
growth over the crisis period suggests that the restrictions of credit supply to ﬁrms due
to bank balance sheet constraints — a credit crunch (Bernanke and Lown, 1991) — played
an important role in reducing output growth. In the US, restrictions to credit availability
for mortgages are among the most important shocks to explain changes in GDP growth
during the crisis period. Finally, our analysis suggests that the policies of the central
banks based on very low interest rates and measures aimed at relaxing bank capital and
liquidity constraints have been providing a signiﬁcant support to the real economy.
These latest results may therefore give some indications on actions to be pursued by
central banks in response to ﬁnancial crises. Our analysis shows that when a ﬁnancial
crisis aects the provision of credit (for example because it aects in particular bank34
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balance sheet capacity), policies aiming at relaxing balance sheet constraints of ﬁnancial
intermediaries may be beneﬁcial and help to sustain economic growth.35
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1. Questions on supply and demand for loans 
QUESTION MARKET SEGMENT VARIABLE DEFINITION
Supply of loans
or credit lines to enterprises 
changed? (Q1)
Net percentage of banks reporting a
tightening of credit standards
to households changed? (Q8)
Demand for loans
enterprises (Q4)
Net percentage of banks reporting
an increase of the demand for loans
households (Q13)
2. Questions on factors affecting the supply of loans
QUESTION FACTORS VARIABLE DEFINITION
A. Costs of funds and balance 
sheet constraints
Costs related to your bank's 
capital position
Your bank's ability to access 
market financing
Your bank's liquidity position
B. Pressure from competition
Competition from other banks
Competition from non-banks
Competition from market 
financing
C. Perception of risk
Expectations regarding general 
economic activity
Industry or firm-specific 
outlook
Risk on the collateral demanded
A. Costs of funds and balance 
sheet constraints
B. Pressure from competition
Competition from other banks
Competition from non-banks
C. Perception of risk
Expectations regarding general 
economic activity
Housing market prospects
A. Costs of funds and balance 
sheet constraints
B. Pressure from competition
Competition from other banks
Competition from non-banks
C. Perception of risk
Expectations regarding general 
economic activity
Creditworthiness of consumers
Risk on the collateral demanded
Note: Q* indicates the number of the question in the survey
Source: European Central Bank
Difference between the sum of the 
banks answering "contributed 
considerably to tightening" and 
"contributed somewhat to 
tightening" and the sum of the 
banks answering "contributed 
somewhat to easing" and 
"contributed considerably to 
easing" in percentage of the total 
number of banks.
Q11 Over the past three 
months, how have the 
following factors
affected your bank’s 
credit standards as 
applied to the approval 
of consumer credit and 
other lending to 
households?
Net percentage of banks reporting 
that each of these factors has 
contributed to the tightening of 
standards to enterprises. 
Pure supply=average of the 
responses to A and B; Borrower
quality =average of the responses to 
C
Net percentage of banks reporting 
that each of these factors has 
contributed to the tightening of 
standards to enterprises. 
Difference between the sum of the 
banks answering "contributed 
considerably to tightening" and 
"contributed somewhat to 
tightening" and the sum of the 
banks answering "contributed 
somewhat to easing" and 
"contributed considerably to 
easing" in percentage of the total 
number of banks.
Q9 Over the past three 
months, how have the 
following factors
affected your bank’s 
credit standards as 
applied to the approval 
of loans to households 
for house purchase?
Pure supply=average of the 
responses to A and B; Borrower
quality =average of the responses to 
C
Net percentage of banks reporting 
that each of these factors has 
contributed to the tightening of 
standards to enterprises.  Difference between the sum of the 
banks answering "contributed 
considerably to tightening" and 
"contributed somewhat to 
tightening" and the sum of the 
banks answering "contributed 
somewhat to easing" and 
"contributed considerably to 
easing" in percentage of the total 
number of banks.
Q2 Over the past three 
months, how have the 
following factors
affected your bank’s 
credit standards as 
applied to the approval 
of loans or credit lines to 
enterprises? Pure supply=average of the 
responses to A and B; Borrower
quality =average of the responses to 
C
Over the past three
months, how have your
bank’s credit standards
as applied to the
approval of loans…
Over the past three
months, how has the
demand for loans or
credit lines to [...]
changed at your bank,
apart from normal
seasonal fluctuations? 
Difference between the sum of
banks answering “tightened
considerably” and “tightened
somewhat” and the sum of banks
answering “eased somewhat” and
“eased considerably” in percentage
of the total number of banks.
Difference between the sum of
banks answering “increased
considerably” and “increased
somewhat” and the sum of banks
answering “decreased somewhat”
and “decreased considerably” in
percentage of the total number of
banks.41
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Appendix
Senior Loan Officer Survey
1. Questions on supply and demand for loans 
QUESTION MARKET SEGMENT VARIABLE DEFINITION
Supply of loans
approving applications for C&I 
loans or credit lines - other than 
those to be used to finance 
mergers and acquisitions - to large 
and middle-market firms 
changed? Q1
from individuals for mortgage 
loans to purchase homes 
changed? (Q9)
for consumer loans other than 
credit card loans changed? (Q15)
Demand for loans
C&I loans changed over the past 
three months? (Q4)
mortgage to purchase homes 
changed over the past three 
months? (Q10)
consumer loans of all types 
changed over the past three 
months? (Q18)
2. Questions on factors affecting the supply of loans
QUESTION FACTORS VARIABLE DEFINITION
A. Current or expected capital 
position
Pure supply  = 
responses to A 
B. Economic outlook and its 
uncertainty
C. Industry specific problems 
Note: Q* indicates the number of the question in the survey
Source: Federal Reserve Board
Borrower quality  = 
average of the 
responses to B and C
Difference between the sum of 
the banks answering 
"contributed considerably to 
tightening" and "contributed 
somewhat to tightening" and the 
sum of the banks answering 
"contributed somewhat to 
easing" and "contributed 
considerably to easing" in 
percentage of the total number 
of banks.
Q3 if your bank has 
tightened or eased its 
credit standards or its 
terms for C&I loans or 
credit lines over the past 
three months, how 
important have been the 
following possible reasons 
for the change?
Difference between the sum of
banks answering “increased
considerably” and “increased
somewhat” and the sum of
banks answering “decreased
somewhat” and “decreased
considerably” in percentage of
the total number of banks.
Over the past three
months, how have your





Net percentage of 
banks reporting an 
increased of the 
demand for loans.
Net percentage of 
banks reporting a 
tightened of credit 
standards
Difference between the sum of
banks answering “tightened
considerably” and “tightened
somewhat” and the sum of
banks answering “eased
somewhat” and “eased
considerably” in percentage of
the total number of banks42
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US
Note: The charts plot the cross-correlation between loan demand at time t-k (Dt-k) and three definitions of loan supply (total,
 borrower and capital) 
at time t (S
t
), for k=-10,…,-1,0,1,…10. Supply and demand refer only to business loans (loans to non-financial corporations in the Euro area
 and 
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Figure 1B. Lending standards and credit supply shocks in the Euro area
Figure 1A. Lending standards and demand for loans in the Euro area
Note: These graphs plot the lending standards and the demand for loans in the Euro area as reported in the BLS. The responses refer to 
business (non-financial corporations) loans. Pure supply is the average of the responses to the questions referring to balance sheet 
constraints and competition. Borrower quality is the average of the responses referring to the economic outlook and borrower specific risks. 
See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables. 
Source: European Central Bank 
Note: These graphs plot the supply for loans in the Euro area as reported in the BLS and the shocks derived from the VAR model. The 
responses refer to business (non-financial corporations) loans. Pure supply is equal to the average of the responses to the questions referring 
to balance sheet constraints and competition. See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables. 
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Figure 2A. Lending standards and demand for loans in the US






















borrower quality (left-hand scale)
pure supply (left-hand scale)
lending standards (left-hand scale)
demand for loans (right-hand scale)
Note: These graphs plot the lending standards and the demand for loans in the US as reported in the SLO. The responses refer to business
(C&I) loans. Pure supply is equal to the responses to the questions referring to capital position. Borrower quality is the average of the 
responses referring to the economic outlook and to industry specific problems. See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of
the variables. 


















1.15 shocks to pure supply (right-hand scale)
pure supply (left-hand scale)
Note: These graphs plot the supply for loans in the US as reported in the SLO and the shocks derived from the VAR model. The responses 
refer to business (C&I) loans. Pure supply is equal to the responses to the questions referring to capital position. See Section 2 and the 
Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board and authors’ calculations 45
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demand for loans supply of loans
US
supply of loans demand for loans
Note: These graphs plot the responses of GDP growth and inflation to a one-standard deviation shock to demand for and supply of loans. Only business loans (loans to non-
financial corporations in the Euro area and C&I loans in the US) are considered.. Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation variances so that all 
responses to a shock are comparable on a single scale. The median response is shown along with 68 (dark blue) and 90 (light blue) percent Bayesian credible intervals, computed 
by estimating the VAR with a flat prior on the parameters and assuming normality of the error terms. The graphs on the first two rows refer to the Euro area, while the others 
show the responses for the United States (US). The panel VAR for the Euro Area is estimated assuming fixed effects, slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy 
as explained in Section 2. The specification of the VAR includes 5 variables: GDP growth, inflation, total demand of loans from firms and total lending standards of loans to 
firms (see specification of MODEL 1 in Section 2.5.)  See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables.



























































































Figure 3C. Counterfactual analysis. Responses of GDP growth and inflation to a monetary policy shock with and 








Note: These graphs report the results of counterfactual experiments. The responses of GDP growth and inflation to a one-standard deviation monetary policy
shock in a full model are compared with the responses obtained when closing down the supply (supply channel) or the demand (demand channel) of business loans 
in the system. The black lines are computed from a system where the supply or demand channel has been closed down. The areas in grey are the confidence bands 
of the responses for the system where all the channels are active. Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation variances so that all 
responses to a shock are comparable on a single scale. The graphs on the first two rows refer to the Euro area, while the others show the responses for the US. The 
panel VAR for the Euro Area is estimated assuming fixed effects, slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy as explained in Section 2. The 
specification of the VAR includes 5 variables: GDP growth, inflation, total demand of loans from firms and total lending standards for firms (see specification of
MODEL 1 in Section 2.5.)  See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables. 






























































































Figure 4A. Responses of  loan demand and supply to a monetary policy shock
loan demand loan supply
Euro area
Responses of 
Note: These graphs plot the responses of loan demand and loan supply to a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock. Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation 
variances so that all responses to a shock are comparable on a single scale. The median response is shown along with 68 (dark blue) and 90 (light blue) percent Bayesian credible intervals, computed
by estimating the VAR with a flat prior on the parameters and assuming normality of the error terms. The graphs on the first three rows refer to the Euro area, for which business, mortgage and 
consumer loans are considered. The last two rows show the responses for the United States (US), where only business and mortgage loans are considered. The panel VAR for the Euro Area is 
estimated assuming fixed effects, slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy as explained in Section 2. The specification of the VAR includes 9 variables: GDP growth, inflation, 
overnight rates, demand and total lending standards for business, mortgages and consumer credit (see MODEL 2 in Section 2.5.) See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the 
variables. 
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GDP growth Inflation GDP growth
demand shock credit availability shock
demand shock credit availability shock
Inflation
Inflation Inflation
Figure 4B. Responses of GDP growth and inflation to loan demand and supply shocks
GDP growth GDP growth
business loans
Note: These graphs plot the responses of GDP growth and inflation to a one-standard deviation shock to loan supply. Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation
variances so that all responses to a shock are comparable on a single scale. The median response is shown along with 68 (dark blue) and 90 (light blue) percent Bayesian credible intervals, 
computed by estimating the VAR with a flat prior on the parameters and assuming normality of the error terms. The graphs on the first three rows refer to the Euro area, for which business, 
mortgage and consumer loans are considered. The last two rows show the responses for the US, where only business and mortgage loans are considered. The panel VAR for the Euro Area is 
estimated assuming fixed effects, slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy as explained in Section 2. The specification of the VAR includes 9 variables: GDP growth, inflation, 
overnight rates, demand and total lending standards for business, mortgages and consumer credit (see MODEL 2 in Section 2.5.) See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the 
variables. 
































































































































































































































Figure 4C. Counterfactual analysis. Responses of GDP growth and inflation to a monetary policy shock with and 





Note: These graphs report counterfactual experiments. The responses of output growth and inflation to a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock
in a full model (grey shaded areas) are compared with the responses obtained when closing down the credit channels (demand or supply, black lines). 
All types of loans are considered. Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation variances so that all responses to a shock are
comparable on a single scale. The graphs on the first six rows refer to the Euro area. The last four rows show the responses for the US. The panel VAR
for the Euro Area is estimated assuming fixed effects, slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy as explained in Section 2. The 
specification of the VAR includes 9 variables: GDP growth, inflation, overnight rates, demand and supply (two channels) for each type of loans (see 
MODEL 2 in Section 2.5). See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables. 








































































































































































Figure 4D. Counterfactual analysis. Responses of GDP growth and inflation to a credit 
availability shock with and without loan demand channels (for a specific borrower category)
GDP growth Inflation
GDP growth Inflation
Note: These graphs report counterfactual experiments. The responses of output growth and inflation to a credit supply shock are compared with the responses obtained when closing 
down the demand channel. All types of loans are considered. Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation variances so that all responses to a shock are 
comparable on a single scale. The graphs on the first six rows refer to the Euro area. The last four rows show the responses for the US. The panel VAR for the Euro Area is estimated
assuming fixed effects, slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy as explained in Section 2. The specification of the VAR includes 9 variables: GDP growth, 
inflation, overnight rates, demand and total lending standards for each type of loans (see MODEL 2 in Section 2.5). See Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the 
variables. 
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pure supply channel borrower's quality channel
Responses of
Inflation







Figure 5B. Firm balance-sheet and bank lending channel. Responses of  GDP growth and inflation to a shock to 






Note: These graphs plot the responses of GDP growth and inflation to a one-standard deviation shock of loan demand and loan supply. Only business loans 
(loans to non-financial corporations) are considered. Loan supply is represented by two different channels: the pure supply and the borrower’s quality 
channel (proxy for the bank lending and the firm balance-sheet channel). Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation variances so 
that all responses to a shock are comparable on a single scale. The median response is shown along with 68 (dark blue) and 90 (light blue) percent Bayesian
credible intervals, computed by estimating the VAR with a flat prior on the parameters and assuming normality of the error terms. The graphs on the first two 
rows refer to the Euro area (EA), while the other rows show the responses for the US. The panel VAR for the Euro Area is estimated assuming fixed effects, 
slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy as explained in Section 2. The specification of the VAR includes 6 variables for the euro area: GDP 
growth, inflation, demand, pure supply lending standards and borrower’s quality lending standards for business loans (see MODEL 2 in Section 2.5.). See 
Section 2 and the Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables. 
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Figure 5C. Counterfactual analysis. Firm balance-sheet and bank lending channel. Responses of 






Note: These graphs report counterfactual experiments. The responses of output growth and inflation to a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock in a full model 
(grey shaded areas) are compared with the responses obtained when closing down the credit channels (one demand channel and two supply channels, black lines). Only 
business loans are considered. Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation variances so that all responses to a shock are comparable on a
single scale. The graphs on the first two rows refer to the Euro area. The last two rows show the responses for the US. The panel VAR for the Euro Area is estimated 
assuming fixed effects, slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy as explained in Section 2. The specification of the VAR includes 6 variables: GDP 
growth, inflation, overnight rates, demand, pure supply lending standards and borrower’s quality lending standards for business loans (see MODEL 2 in Section 2.5.) 
See Section 2 and Appendix for a detailed definition of the variables. 



























































































































Figure 6A. Responses of loan demand and supply (bank lending and borrower's bank lending 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































business loans mortgage loans consumer loans
Inflation
Figure 6B. Responses of Euro area GDP growth and inflation to a shock to loan demand and loan 
supply (bank lending and borrower's balance sheet channel), all category of borrowers.
business loans mortgage loans consumer loans
GDP growth
Note: These graphs report the responses of GDP growth and inflation to a shock to loan demand and loan supply (via bank lending and borrower’s balance sheet channels) for all 
category of borrowers (business, mortgage and consumer loans). Responses of the series are normalised and divided by their innovation variances so that all responses to a shock
are comparable on a single scale. The median response is shown along with 68 (dark blue) and 90 (light blue) percent Bayesian credible intervals, computed by estimating the VAR
with a flat prior on the parameters and assuming normality of the error terms. The graphs refer to the Euro area. The panel VAR for the Euro Area is estimated assuming fixed 
effects, slope homogeneity and the country identification strategy as explained in Section 2. The specification of the VAR includes 9 variables: GDP growth, inflation, overnight 
rates, demand, pure supply lending standards and borrower’s quality lending standards for all type of loans (see MODEL 4 in Section 2.5.) See Section 2 and the Appendix for a 
detailed definition of the variables. 

























































































































































Figure 6C. Counterfactual analysis. Firm, household and bank balance-sheet channels in the Euro area. Responses of GDP growth a
nd inflation to a 
monetary policy shock when closing down loan demand and loan supply (pure supply and borrower's quality) channels for each cate
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Loan demand from firms
Loan demand for mortgages
Loan demand for consumer credit
Loan supply to firms
Loan supply for mortgages
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Figure 7B. Historical decomposition. The impact of different shocks during the financial crisis in the Euro area (pure credit supply and borrower's quality shocks)
Own shock
Inflation
Loan demand from firms
Loan demand for mortgages
Loan demand for consumer credit
Pure supply to firms
Borrowers' quality - firms
Pure supply for mortgages
Borrowers' quality - mortgages
Pure supply for consumer credit
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